Site icon Liam Cleary [MVP Alumni and MCT]

Microsoft Is Finally Making Server Core Secure by Default

For years, securing Windows Server has followed a relatively familiar process. We deploy the operating system, configure the necessary roles and features, join it to the domain, and then begin applying the security configurations needed to meet our organization’s requirements. Whether those configurations come from Microsoft’s security baselines, Group Policy, OSConfig, CIS benchmarks, DISA STIG recommendations, or our own PowerShell scripts, the general approach has remained the same. We install Windows Server first and then spend time securing it. While this has worked for many organizations, it has always introduced an interesting problem: the operating system is not necessarily running with our expected security configuration from the moment it is installed. Depending on the deployment process, there may be a period when unnecessary services, older authentication protocols, or less restrictive security settings remain available until the appropriate hardening is complete.

On November 17, 2026, Microsoft announced a significant change to this approach with the introduction of Hardened Server Core for Windows Server 2028. Starting with Windows Server Insider Preview build 29706, Microsoft is introducing hundreds of security configurations that are enabled by default when Server Core is first installed. Instead of expecting administrators to apply security controls after deployment, the operating system starts with a hardened configuration, and administrators make specific adjustments only when their workloads require them. This represents an important shift in how Microsoft approaches Windows Server security, particularly for organizations that have invested considerable time developing and maintaining their own server hardening processes.

What makes this announcement particularly interesting is that Microsoft is not simply introducing another security baseline or collection of recommended configurations. The hardened settings are incorporated directly into the operating system image and are designed to work together across multiple security areas, including authentication, networking, cryptography, administrative privileges, operating system integrity, remote management, and auditing. Microsoft has also aligned these configurations with established industry benchmarks, including CIS and DISA STIG recommendations, helping organizations establish a stronger and more consistent starting point. Of course, this does not mean that deploying Windows Server 2028 automatically makes an organization compliant with a particular security framework, but it should reduce some of the work required to establish and maintain an appropriate security configuration.

Changing the Way We Approach Windows Server Security

One challenge with traditional Windows Server deployments is that security configurations can vary significantly between systems, even when those systems are intended to perform similar functions. An organization might have a carefully developed security baseline, but its effectiveness depends on how consistently it is deployed and maintained. Some servers may be missing specific configurations, while others may have exceptions introduced during application installations or troubleshooting. Over time, these differences can create configuration drift, making it increasingly difficult for administrators to determine whether their servers still meet the organization’s intended security requirements.

This becomes particularly noticeable in environments that mix operating system versions, legacy applications, and different management technologies. A server deployed several years ago may still rely on authentication protocols or network settings that are no longer recommended, while newer servers might have additional protections enabled through updated security baselines. Administrators must account for these differences when reviewing configurations, investigating security incidents, or preparing for operating system upgrades. Although technologies such as OSConfig, Group Policy, and configuration management platforms help address these challenges, they still require organizations to establish, apply, and maintain the appropriate configurations.

Hardened Server Core changes the starting point by making many of those security decisions part of the operating system itself. Rather than beginning with a broad compatibility-focused configuration and progressively restricting it, administrators begin with stronger defaults and determine whether specific workloads require changes. I think this distinction matters because it encourages organizations to question why a particular security control needs to be relaxed, rather than assuming less restrictive behavior should remain available unless someone explicitly disables it. For example, if an application requires an older authentication mechanism or an insecure remote management configuration, administrators must now identify that dependency and decide whether an exception is appropriate. Ideally, this should encourage organizations to modernize applications and address technical debt instead of continually weakening the security configuration to accommodate older workloads.

However, Microsoft has highlighted an important consideration. Applications, services, or administrative tools that worked correctly on Windows Server 2025 may not behave the same way on Windows Server 2028. This is not necessarily because the application itself has changed, but because the underlying operating system may no longer permit certain behaviors by default. Organizations should treat this announcement as an opportunity to evaluate their infrastructure, particularly where older protocols, authentication methods, and management scripts are involved.

What Security Improvements Are Being Introduced?

Microsoft is implementing hardened configurations across several areas of Windows Server to reduce the operating system’s attack surface while strengthening protections around identities, communications, and administrative access. One of the most important areas is authentication and credential protection, where the new defaults favor Kerberos over NTLM, introduce additional LSASS protections, and strengthen password and account lockout configurations. These improvements are particularly relevant because credential theft, password attacks, and the misuse of legacy authentication remain common methods attackers use to compromise Windows environments. Protecting the authentication process and reducing opportunities for credentials to be stolen or reused should therefore be a fundamental part of any Windows Server security strategy.

It is worth mentioning that NTLM is not completely blocked in the current preview. Microsoft has identified broader NTLM blocking as an area that will be introduced in future builds, so administrators should not assume that Hardened Server Core immediately eliminates every NTLM dependency. Instead, this is an opportunity to begin identifying where NTLM is still being used, particularly by older applications, services, and systems that may not support Kerberos authentication. In larger environments, this can be more complicated than expected because authentication dependencies are not always obvious until an application stops functioning. Understanding those dependencies before moving to Windows Server 2028 will help organizations avoid unnecessary disruption when the security defaults become more restrictive.

Network security is another area receiving considerable attention. Hardened Server Core enables Windows Firewall across all profiles, strengthens SMB communications through signing and encryption protections, and disables certain legacy name resolution mechanisms and unauthenticated RPC behaviors. These configurations are intended to reduce opportunities for attackers to intercept communications, exploit older network protocols, or interact with services that do not require appropriate authentication. For administrators, the challenge will be ensuring that existing infrastructure supports these requirements. Older file-sharing applications, network devices, or systems using outdated SMB configurations may need updating, reconfiguring, or replacement before they can communicate successfully with the new hardened environment.

Microsoft is also strengthening cryptographic configurations by restricting TLS to modern cipher suites and introducing hybrid post-quantum key exchange capabilities using ML-KEM. This is particularly interesting given the growing attention surrounding quantum-resistant cryptography and the need for organizations to prepare for future cryptographic threats. Hybrid key exchange allows supported communications to combine traditional cryptographic mechanisms with post-quantum approaches, helping organizations begin transitioning toward newer protection methods. However, it is important to understand that having these capabilities does not automatically make every application or communication channel quantum-resistant. Actual protection depends on protocol support, the cryptographic mechanisms negotiated between systems, and the capabilities of the applications involved. From an administrative perspective, the immediate consideration will be identifying applications that still depend on outdated TLS versions or cipher suites, as these may encounter compatibility problems under the new defaults.

Administrative privileges and operating system integrity are also being addressed. Hardened Server Core introduces tighter controls around privilege elevation, restricts powerful user rights, prevents Guest accounts from signing in, and limits installers’ ability to elevate privileges automatically. Microsoft is also strengthening protections around the sign-in process, code signing, and the paging file, including restrictions on the code that can be loaded into sensitive operating system processes. These controls help reduce opportunities for attackers to misuse privileged access or manipulate critical operating system components after gaining an initial foothold. They do not replace the need for privileged access management, separate administrative identities, or appropriate monitoring, but they provide additional protection at the operating system level.

Another improvement that I particularly like involves remote management and auditing. Windows Server environments increasingly rely on PowerShell, Windows Admin Center, remote management tools, and automation rather than administrators signing in interactively to perform every task. Hardened Server Core strengthens these management channels by disabling insecure WinRM authentication options, including Basic and Digest authentication, as well as unencrypted communications. Remote Desktop is also configured to use stronger authentication and TLS protections. At the same time, Microsoft is enabling more comprehensive auditing, including command-line information for process creation, PowerShell script block logging, and increased event log capacity. These improvements should give security teams better visibility into administrative activity and potentially suspicious behavior, although organizations still need to ensure the resulting events are collected, retained, and monitored appropriately.

For organizations using Microsoft Sentinel or another SIEM platform, these logging improvements are particularly useful because they can provide additional information during investigations. However, enabling more detailed auditing can also increase event volumes, which may affect storage requirements and ingestion costs. Administrators should consider how these additional events will be collected and analyzed, and whether existing detection rules and monitoring processes need updating. There is little benefit in generating large amounts of security information if that information is never reviewed or used to identify potential threats.

How Microsoft Is Enforcing the New Security Defaults

One of the more interesting technical aspects of Hardened Server Core is how Microsoft is implementing the security configurations. Rather than relying entirely on local registry settings or post-installation scripts, supported hardened values are delivered through Windows policy configuration, including the following registry location:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies

This is important because policy-controlled settings take precedence over corresponding local configurations where the Windows component supports that behavior. For example, an application installer or PowerShell script may try to modify a local configuration value, but if the hardened policy controls that setting, the local change may not affect the effective security configuration. This helps protect against situations where application installations, troubleshooting scripts, or administrative changes unintentionally weaken settings that the organization expects to remain enforced.

Administrators still retain control over these configurations through supported management technologies, including Group Policy and OSConfig. However, Microsoft recommends that organizations establish which management platform controls each setting. If OSConfig enforces one configuration while Group Policy attempts to apply a different value, the server may experience configuration conflicts or unexpected behavior. This becomes particularly important when using tools that automatically detect and correct configuration drift, because multiple management systems could repeatedly attempt to restore different values. My recommendation is to establish a clear configuration ownership model, ensuring the same security setting isn’t managed independently by several different technologies.

There is also an interesting reporting behavior that administrators should be aware of. When using traditional Group Policy reporting tools such as gpresult or Resultant Set of Policy (RSOP), some of the hardened settings may appear as Not Configured, even though the operating system is actively enforcing them. Microsoft explains that this happens because the hardened defaults are incorporated directly into the operating system image rather than being applied through a traditional Group Policy file. Consequently, those reporting tools do not necessarily recognize the built-in configuration as an applied policy. This distinction matters because administrators may otherwise assume a configuration is missing when it is actually being enforced.

To give administrators a better way to inspect these configurations, Microsoft introduced a new evaluation and management capability called MSHardenedPolicyEval. This tool is included with Windows Server Insider Preview and provides PowerShell commands to evaluate, restore, and reapply the hardened configurations. It also offers a more consistent way to understand which settings currently meet Microsoft’s expected hardened state.

Evaluating and Managing Hardened Server Core with PowerShell

For administrators who prefer working with PowerShell, MSHardenedPolicyEval is probably one of the most useful additions accompanying this announcement. Rather than manually checking hundreds of registry values, security policies, and operating system configurations, administrators can use a common set of commands to evaluate their servers against Microsoft’s hardened policy definitions. This is particularly useful when testing application compatibility, reviewing configuration changes, or investigating why a server isn’t meeting the expected security configuration.

The first command to become familiar with is Get-MSHardenedPolicyScore which evaluates the current server against Microsoft’s hardened configuration and returns an overall score along with results for individual security categories. Open an elevated PowerShell session on a supported preview build and run the following:

Get-MSHardenedPolicyScore

The results can also be formatted into a table that displays the category name, number of passing policies, total policies evaluated, and the resulting score:

Get-MSHardenedPolicyScore |
Format-Table Name,
PassingPolicyCount,
PolicyCount,
Score -AutoSize

This provides administrators with a useful starting point for understanding the server’s current configuration. Rather than simply reporting that a server is hardened or not hardened, the command allows administrators to identify specific categories where the expected configurations are not being met. For example, a server might meet the hardened requirements for Windows Firewall and remote management while reporting a lower score for SMB and file sharing. Administrators can then investigate that category rather than reviewing every security setting individually.

To identify the categories supported by the current preview, run:

Get-MSHardenedPolicyCategories

Remember that the scoring capability is still under development. Microsoft has indicated that not every security setting is currently included in the evaluation, with some cryptographic configurations and other protections not yet being measured. Certain scores may also depend on whether the associated Windows Server component is installed, while systems running the Key Distribution Center, such as domain controllers, may report some configurations as unmet even when they have been applied. For these reasons, administrators should not interpret a score below 100 percent as automatic evidence that a server has been incorrectly configured, nor should a high score be considered proof that the operating system is protected against every security threat.

Another useful capability is the ability to verify that a hardened setting is actually being enforced. For example, Hardened Server Core disables Basic authentication for WinRM through policy. If an administrator attempts to enable that configuration locally using PowerShell, the operating system should reject the change because the setting is already controlled by policy:

Set-Item `
WSMan:\localhost\Service\Auth\Basic `
-Value $true

Under the expected hardened configuration, this command fails because the local setting cannot override the policy-controlled value. This demonstrates how the new defaults provide additional protection against unintended changes, particularly when scripts or applications attempt to modify local operating system configurations without accounting for the enforced policy.

There will, of course, be circumstances where a particular workload requires different behavior. To accommodate these situations, Microsoft has provided the Restore-MSHardenedPolicy command, which allows administrators to remove the hardened policy values associated with a specific category. For example, if an application requires changes to the remote management configuration, administrators can first preview the impact using the -WhatIf parameter:

Restore-MSHardenedPolicy `
-Category RemoteManagement `
-WhatIf

If the changes are understood and justified, the category can then be restored using:

Restore-MSHardenedPolicy `
-Category RemoteManagement

An important distinction is that restoring a category removes the associated hardened policy values and returns those settings to standard Windows Server behavior. It does not restore a previously captured configuration snapshot, and it may affect multiple security controls within that category rather than only the individual setting responsible for the compatibility issue. For that reason, I would avoid using this approach as a general troubleshooting shortcut. If an application has a problem with one particular security configuration, administrators should first identify the setting responsible and determine whether a more targeted change can be made through the appropriate management platform.

If a category has been restored, the hardened configuration can be reapplied using Set-MSHardenedPolicy. As with the restore operation, administrators can preview the expected changes before applying them:

Set-MSHardenedPolicy `
-Category RemoteManagement `
-WhatIf

To reapply the hardened values, run:

Set-MSHardenedPolicy `
-Category RemoteManagement

Both commands support operations across multiple categories, and omitting the category parameter allows the broader set of hardened configurations to be restored or applied. Some changes may also require the server to restart before they take effect. For administrators who prefer using a command-line executable, Microsoft also includes MSHardenedPolicyEval.exe in %SystemRoot%\System32, which provides similar functionality and supports recording evaluation information through log files and the Windows event log.

There is one particularly important warning regarding these management commands. Microsoft recommends that once a server is being managed through OSConfig, Group Policy, or another configuration management solution, the MSHardenedPolicyEval tools should be used for evaluation rather than modifying the configuration directly. Applying or restoring hardened settings independently of the management platform can create conflicts and leave the server in an unexpected state. Administrators should therefore determine how the built-in evaluation capabilities fit into their existing management processes rather than treating them as a replacement for centralized security configuration.

Finally, because this functionality is currently part of an Insider Preview, Microsoft has indicated that some of the command names and behavior may change in future builds. This is worth remembering before incorporating these commands into scripts or automated deployment processes intended for long-term production use.

Preparing Your Environment for Windows Server 2028

Although Hardened Server Core is currently available through the Windows Server Insider program, I think organizations should begin evaluating the implications now rather than waiting until Windows Server 2028 becomes generally available. The most obvious starting point is to identify applications and infrastructure components that still depend on legacy authentication, outdated cryptographic configurations, or network protocols that may no longer be permitted under the new defaults. These dependencies can be difficult to identify in established environments, particularly where applications have been running for many years or where the original configuration decisions are no longer documented.

Authentication is an area I would prioritize, especially where NTLM is still used by applications, scheduled tasks, services, or devices. Even though broader NTLM blocking is planned for a future preview rather than enforced in the initial release, understanding these dependencies will make future migrations significantly easier. I would also review SMB configurations, TLS requirements, and remote management tools to identify systems that may depend on behavior that Windows Server 2028 will restrict. This is particularly relevant for older file servers, management applications, and infrastructure components that have not been updated to support modern security protocols.

Existing deployment and automation scripts should also be reviewed. Many organizations have accumulated PowerShell scripts that configure services, update registry values, or change local security settings during deployment. Some of those scripts may no longer behave as expected when the corresponding configuration is controlled by an operating system policy. Rather than discovering these problems during a production deployment, administrators should test their existing scripts against a hardened Server Core installation and identify which configuration changes are rejected or no longer necessary.

For practical testing, I recommend building an isolated Windows Server 2028 environment using Insider Preview build 29706 or a later supported build, and configuring it to represent the workloads used in your organization. The objective should be to evaluate more than whether the operating system installs successfully. Administrators should test domain authentication, application installation, remote management, SMB connectivity, backup and monitoring agents, configuration management tools, and any other services that interact with the operating system. Before making changes, record the initial hardened policy score and document which security categories are being enforced. This provides a useful reference when investigating compatibility problems or comparing results after installing applications.

A simple testing approach would include the following areas:

AreaRecommended validation
Identity and authenticationKerberos, NTLM dependencies, service accounts, and domain authentication
Network securityFirewall behavior, SMB signing and encryption, and legacy connectivity
CryptographyTLS compatibility, cipher suite requirements, and certificate-dependent applications
Remote managementPowerShell remoting, WinRM, RDP, and administrative tools
ApplicationsInstallation, startup, required permissions, and service dependencies
Configuration managementGroup Policy, OSConfig, and existing PowerShell deployment scripts
Security monitoringWindows event collection, PowerShell logging, and SIEM integration
Security exceptionsRequired changes, their impact, and whether they can be narrowly scoped

When compatibility problems are discovered, the goal should be to understand why the application requires a particular configuration rather than immediately removing the corresponding security protection. In some cases, the solution may be as simple as updating an application or changing how it authenticates. In others, particularly with older business-critical workloads, administrators may need to introduce carefully controlled exceptions while planning a longer-term modernization effort. Whatever approach is taken, those exceptions should be documented and reviewed periodically to ensure they remain necessary.

It is also worth recognizing that Microsoft has not finished introducing all the planned hardened configurations. Future preview builds are expected to include broader NTLM blocking, additional hardware-backed protections such as Secure Boot and DMA protection requirements, kernel shadow stacks, and further improvements related to printing and RPC. This means organizations should continue testing as new builds become available, because workloads that function correctly under the current preview may behave differently as Microsoft introduces additional restrictions.

Final Thoughts

I think Hardened Server Core represents an important and overdue improvement in how Windows Server approaches security. For many years, organizations have invested significant effort in developing security baselines, hardening scripts, and configuration management processes to compensate for operating system defaults that were designed primarily around broad compatibility. While those processes remain valuable, they introduce additional complexity and depend heavily on consistent implementation. By incorporating stronger security configurations directly into the operating system, Microsoft is reducing some of that dependency and making a hardened configuration the expected starting point for new Server Core deployments.

What I particularly like about this approach is that it changes how administrators think about security exceptions. Instead of asking which protections should be enabled after installation, the question becomes why an existing protection needs to be relaxed. That is a much more useful conversation, especially when dealing with legacy applications and infrastructure that may have accumulated technical debt over several years. There will undoubtedly be situations where organizations need to make exceptions, and Microsoft has recognized this by providing tools to evaluate and adjust the hardened configuration. However, those exceptions should be intentional decisions supported by an understanding of the risks involved, rather than changes made simply because an application does not immediately work.

It is also important to recognize that Hardened Server Core does not remove the need for security baselines, configuration management, monitoring, or ongoing security assessments. The operating system may begin with a stronger configuration, but organizations still need to manage privileged access, maintain updates, review security events, protect sensitive information, and ensure that configuration changes do not introduce unnecessary risk. Technologies such as OSConfig, Group Policy, Microsoft Defender, and Microsoft Sentinel will continue to play important roles in maintaining and monitoring the overall security of Windows Server environments. What changes is that administrators should have a stronger foundation on which to build those additional protections.

For organizations planning their future Windows Server deployments, my recommendation is to begin testing the preview, evaluate existing applications and management processes, and use the opportunity to identify dependencies on older protocols and insecure configurations. The more of those issues we can address before moving to Windows Server 2028, the easier it should be to benefit from the new hardened defaults without introducing unnecessary compatibility problems.

Ultimately, security should not be something we have to remember to add after installing an operating system. It should be part of the operating system from the beginning. Hardened Server Core moves Windows Server further in that direction, and I think it is a positive change for administrators and security teams alike.


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